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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
Robert H. Klugman*
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence of Alcoholic Intoxication where
Specimen of Blood Obtained without Defendant's Knowledge-The de-
fense of privilege against self-incrimination in connection with an in-
toxication test was the subject of controversy in People v. Tucker
(California, 1948) 198 P. (2d) 941. Defendant was taken to a hospital
following an automobile accident. A sample of his blood was obtained
without his knowledge and tested for alcoholic content. In a criminal
prosecution for violation of a section of the Vehicle Code pertaining to
injuring while intoxicated, the doctor was permitted to testify, over
defendant's objection, that the blood contained an alcoholic content of
3.5 milligrams of alcohol per c.c. and that such amount of alcohol indi-
cated a definite degree of intoxication. Defendant was convicted, and he
appealed.
The California District Court of Appeal, while citing no California
case directly in point, concluded that the admission of testimony concern-
ing the blood test was not error and did not violate defendant's right
against self-incrimination. There is no clear indication whether the
decision rested on the defendant's lack of objection at the time of the
test (he was apparently unconscious) or on the assumption that a forced
physical disclosure never violates the rule against self-incrimination.
Although there is some language in the court's opinion which indicates
that if a defendant objected to the taking of the specimen the results of
the test might be inadmissible, the court cited People v. One 1941 Mer-
cury Sedan, 74 Cal. App. (2d) 199, 168 P. (2d) 443 (1946), with ap-
proval. In that case a defendant was forced to allow his stomach to be
pumped and the contents analyzed for evidence of narcotics allegedly
swallowed. The privilege against self-incrimination was held there to
apply only to oral or written forced disclosures and not to forced dis-
closure of physical facts. It would seem fhat a forced blood test would
fit within that formula and that in California a defendant can now be
forced to submit to such a test. (For additional information regarding
this general problem see particularly the following articles previously
published in this Journal: Vol. 28, page 261; Vol. 36, page 132.)
Gambling Offense Committed in Presence of Officer Justifies Seizure
of Evidence-A somewhat unique method of obtaining evidence of un-
lawful operation of a gambling establishment was upheld by the Supreme
Court of Arizona in State v. Pelosi, (Arizona, 1948) 199 P. (2d) 125. An
employee of the attorney general visited the alleged gambling establish-
ment and placed a one-dollar bet on a Florida horse-race. Relying on
this information the attorney general obtained from the superior court a
temporary restraining order enjoining Lne conducting or continuance of
a public nuisance. The attorney general, three dep-aties, and reporters
then entered the defendant's premises to serve the temporary restraining
order. Defendants were engaged at the time in "calling" the progress of
a race. Officers then seized abundant evidence of over 30 violations of a
statute prohibiting wagering on horse or dog races.
Appellants moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that it was
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the result of an illegal search and seizure since there was no warrant for
iheir arrest and no warrant to search their property.
The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, pointing out the
fact that appellants were committing an offense, namely maintaining a
public nuisance, in the presence of tile arresting officers. This was ade-
quate reason for seizure of evidence, and evidence lawfully seized is com-
petent to prove any offense charged. The officers were not trespassers
but entered defendants' premises for a lawmful purpose. On seeing an
offense committed in their presence, they were justified in arresting de-
fendants and seizing evidence relating to that offense. (See the following
notes on search and seizure which have appeared in the current volume
of this Journal: Vol. 39, pages 208 and 354.)
Firearms Identification: Evidence of Similarity of Class Characteristics
of Fatal Bullet and Defendant's Pistol-Defendant in a recent case was
convicted of involuntary manslaughter. Among other errors assigned,
objection was made to rulings relating to the admissibility of defendant's
revolver and the bullet extracted from the deceased. A gun, fully loaded
with special .38 caliber shells, was found in the tavern where the shooting
occurred. This was identified as a Colt revolver belonging to the de-
fendant and registered in his name. A special agent for the F.B.I. identi-
fied the bullet extracted from the deceased's body as a special .38 caliber
bullet fired from a gun having riflings similar to those of the gun found.
He also stated that Colt and no other American-manufactured revolvers
have this type of rifling. The bullet was too badly deformed to positively
identify it as having been fired from the gun found, however.
The Supreme Court of Montana, in overruling defendant's contention
that unless the gun could be identified positively it could not be admitted
in evidence, stated that weapons which appear to have been employed in
the commission of a crime are admissible and that no clear, certain, or
positive evidence is required. The court also stated that no instruction
was necessary, or in fact proper, to the effect that the exhibits were not
admitted to connect the defendant with homicide. This would have in-
vaded the province of the jury, for the evidence, although circumstantial,
was sufficient to justify the jury in finding that the bullet extracted from
the deceased's body was fired from defendant's revolver. State v. Allison
(Montana, 1948) 199 P. (2d) 279.
Fingerprint Evidence: Expert's Opinion Regarding Conclusiveness of
Similarity between Defendant's Prints and Questioned Prints; Required
Number of Points of Similarity-Three interesting aspects of expert tes-
timony concerning fingerprint comparison were discussed in the case of
State v. Viola, 82 N. E. (2d) 306; 148 Ohio State 712, 76 N. E. (2d) 715
(Ohio, 1947). Defendant was linked to a barroom killing by two latent
fingerprints on a drinking glass. The prosecution called to the stand an
agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who had compared the
fingerprints on the glass with defendant's fingerprints in the general
files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington.
The first error urged on appeal in connection with the agent's testi-
mony was the statement that the fingerprints on the drinking glass were
those of the defendant and "no other finger made the impression or could
have made it." The appellate court concluded that this was opinion tes-
timony and not testimony of an ultimate fact, since the ultimate fact
would be the guilt or the innocence of the accused.
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Secondly, it was urged that the statement made by the agent on cross-
examination that the F.B.I. recognized no rule that twelve points of
similarity were necessary to identify fingerprints was a subject of con-
troversy and the defendant should have been allowed to produce a certain
document showing that twelve points were requisite. The appellate court
held that since the witness had admitted that the document in question
existed but had merely maintained that the F.B.I. did not recognize the
rule and since one of the two fingerprints did contain twelve points of
similarity, this was not reversible error.
Thirdly, appellant urged that the statement by the agent that the
F.B.I. "in my opinion . . . is recognized as being the world's authority
on prints" constituted reversible error. This contention was also over-
ruled, and the conviction for murder was affirmed.
Firearms Identification Expert Must Identify Death Weapon by State-
ment of Opinion, Not Fact-During the course of a trial resulting in
the defendant's conviction for voluntary manslaughter, a firearms iden-
tification expert was called by the state to establish the fact that the
bullet which killed the deceased came from the defendant's gun. He
explained in detail the experiments which had been made with the
weapon in question and recounted the findings of a comparison test be-
tween his test bullet and the death bullet, following which he was asked
if he could state positively that the death bullet was fired from the de-
fendant's gun. He answered that he did so state. Objections to this
question were overruled, and the defendant appealed on the grounds
that such testimony was expert testimony, limiting the witness to ex-
pressions of opinion only. The reviewing court construed the answer
as a statement of fact and upheld the defendant's contention. State v.
Martinez, 198 P. (2d) 256 (N.M., 1948).
Recognizing that firearms identification methods are intrinsically re-
liable, the court based its decision on the fact that the ability and knowl-
edge of the individual expert may vary considerably, and a rule of gen-
eral applicability should take account of such variations. In so doing
it ignored the preliminary qualification procedure necessary to introduce
expert testimony as a protection against that weakness. The rule of
this case seems dubious in view of the fact that fingerprint experts may
make factual identifications. (People v. Jennings, 252 Ill. 534, 96 N.E.
1077 (1911) ; State v. Kuhl, 42 Nev. 185, 175, Pac. 190 (1918). Actually
the problem presented is one of phraseology of questions and answers
since the State's Attorney could just as well have asked if it was the
expert's opinion that both bullets were fired from the same gun.
[Vol. 39
